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The effect of corporate governance variables on share price: A comparison 
of “A Class” and “B Class” shares in the People's Republic of China 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the interaction between corporate governance and earnings as they affect 
market performance. The research focuses on Chinese capital markets because of their unique 
characteristics with respect to elements of corporate governance.  Specifically, Chinese companies 
may issue A-shares to Chinese citizens or B-shares to foreign investors and overseas Chinese or 
Chinese citizens with foreign currency. B-shares produce reports based on International Accounting 
Standards, have an independent board structure, and use international recognised auditor. 
Companies with A-shares only use Chinese Accounting Standards, do not have independent boards 
of directors and use Chinese auditors operating under Chinese audit standards.  
The differences in governances characteristic between A-share companies and companies with AB-
shares provides a useful site to test the relevance of international governance standards in a 
developing market. Specifically, a matched pair design using Event Study Methodology provides a 
comparison between the market responses to an earnings announcement where differences in 
governance practices exist.  
The results indicate that the Chinese stock markets were segmented before the relaxation of 
restrictions on purchase of B-shares by domestic investors in 2001 and they remained segmented 
after the regulation change in 2001.  Accordingly, the analysis of governance impacts was assessed 
in these two segments.   
The results suggest that corporate governance does not effects market’s reactions to earnings. 
Investors do not react differently to earnings announcements due to different accounting standards, 
board structure and audit quality.  Contrary to expectation, the earnings response of AB-shares’ is 
not significantly different from that of A-shares’ earnings response. These findings imply that 
Chinese listed companies based on Western governance perform no better than Chinese listed 
companies based on Chinese governance, in terms of the market’s reactions to earnings 
announcement.  
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THE EFFECT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES ON SHARE PRICE: A COMPARISON OF “A 
CLASS” AND “B CLASS” SHARES IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
INTRODUCTION  
Although much attention has been given to corporate governance in the United States and other 
Western countries ((Palepu 1990) (Abdel-khalik 2002) (Holmström and Kaplan 2003) (Volpin 
2002) (Romano 2004) much has also been going on in Russia, East Asian countries, and other 
transition economies in the area of corporate governance (Black et al. 2006; Black 2001).  This 
paper tests whether corporate governance impacts on the relevance and reliability of the accounting 
earnings information in the Chinese market  The Chinese stock market provides a unique research 
site in because both western and local governance operate within the one market through its use of 
two classes of shares, A Shares and B Shares. A shares have Chinese governance and firms with 
both A and B shares have Western governance.  This study uses event study methodology with a 
matched pair sample of companies with A Shares only (Chinese governance standards) and those 
with A and B shares (Western Governance).  We find that Chinese A and B-share markets react 
differently to earnings produced under IAS, compared with earnings based on the Chinese GAAP. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  The next section details the dual system of 
governance in the Peoples Republic of China (PPRC) - Western corporate governance for 
companies with A and B class shares and Chinese corporate governance for companies with A class 
shares only.  Section three details the relevant theories of corporate governance which suggest that 
market performance of firms with Western governance should be greater than those with Chinese 
governance.  Section four presents the hypotheses to be tested and the event study methodology to  
OVERVIEW OF STOCK MARKETS IN CHINA 
The history of stock trading in China can be traced back to the 1860s. The first share list appeared 
in June 1866 and came to an abrupt halt after Japanese troops occupied the Shanghai International 
Settlement on December 1941. On November 26, 1990, Shanghai Stock Exchange was established 
again and officially opened on December 19.  Shenzhen Stock Exchange was established in early 
1991.  
China’s stock markets at Shanghai and Shenzhen have features that differ significantly from 
Western stock markets. The most pronounced feature is the complicated structure of Chin’s stocks, 
which are classified by accessibility into A-shares, B-shares, H-shares and N-shares. A-shares are 
available to Chinese residents and B-shares are also available to Chinese residents with foreign 
currency since 2001. A-shares and B-shares are listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. H-shares and N-shares are listed in Hong Kong and overseas stock markets. AB shares 
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are the focus of this research. A-shares prices fluctuate extensively and trade at a premium, relative 
to B-shares which are relative steady.  
The key differences between A-shares governance and AB-shares governance are share structure, 
auditor independence, accounting standard and ownership of stocks. The differences in governances 
characteristic between A-share companies and companies with AB-shares provides a useful site to 
test the relevance of international governance standards in a developing market. Specifically, a 
matched pair design using Event Study Methodology provides a comparison between the market 
responses to an earnings announcement where differences in governance practices exist.  
MODEL OVERVIEW 
While there have been a large number of studies address the relationship between corporate 
governance and company-market performance, the results are mixed (Hutchinson and Gul 2004; 
Mukherjee 2001; Denis 2001; Bianco and Casavola 1999; Diacon and O'Sullivan 1995; Shrives 
2004).  Part of the problem with this research is the difficulty in designing an empirical test where 
the effects of changes in governance can be measured while controlling for other factors. The 
Chinese stock market provides a unique research site in that both western and local governance 
operate within the one market.  Further, there exist different classes of shares within the same 
industry but that have different governance mechanisms due to the nature of their shareholding.  
This provides for a direct comparison of the effects of governance on firm performance.  
EARNINGS RESPONSE MODEL 
While earnings is shown to have a positive association with market value (Ball and Brown 1968), 
this research argues for corporate governance playing a moderating role on the earnings value 
relationship.  Corporate governance may increase the reliability of earnings, thereby increasing the 
value-relevance of earnings and/or it may impact on the level of earning of the firm. In other words, 
corporate governance may have a positive impact on the association between earnings and market 
value (Ball et al. 2000; Kormendi 1987; Dina F and Abdulatia 2006; Donnelly 2002; Ohlson 1983, 
1995; Ohlson 1999).   
The comprehensive literature on the positive impact on corporate governance on the firms suggests 
that these variables may have a direct impact on market value in addition to its impact on the 
reliability of earnings and book value. In this research, the impact of corporate governance on the 
company wealth is assessed as either a direct impact or indirectly via earnings.   
Figure 1 provides a schematic of the relationship between earnings, change in earnings and 
reliability in affecting the company wealth.  
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FIGURE 1: EARNINGS RESPONSE MODEL 
 
From Figure 1, both earnings and change in earnings are expected to have a positive association 
with return reflecting the value-relevance of the accounting measures.  
The model suggests that corporate governance plays a moderating role, impacting on the association 
between earnings and returns. Thus, corporate governance plays a critical role, as an indicator of 
earnings reliability, between company’s earnings and returns (Collins and DeAngelo 1990; Guercio 
and Hawkins 1999; Chen et al. 1999; Suk-Yee Lee et al. 2005; Black et al. 2006). 
No finance theory provides a formal direct link between corporate governance and the share return.  
However, a number of studies have suggested such a relationship empirically by directly comparing 
the association between corporate governance and share returns (Jones 2004; Yoshikawa and Phan 
2003; Salva 2003; Suk-Yee Lee et al. 2005; Bauer et al. 2003; Lemmon and Lins 2001; Nguyen and 
Aman 2006).  In addition, other studies show that corporate governance impacts directly on 
accounting earnings and thus is indirectly linked to the changes in share returns (Xie et al. ; Collins 
and DeAngelo 1990; Bushman et al. 2004; Xie et al. 2003; Suk-Yee Lee et al. 2005; Alford et al. 
1993; Anderson et al. 2003; Brown and Ngo Higgins 2001; Bauer et al. 2003) (Lawrence and 
Stapledon 1999; Hutchinson and Gul 2004; Bai et al. 2004) 
The greater effectiveness of corporate governance should result in a greater return. Therefore a 
greater return should be derived from earning prepared under Western governance requirements 
compared to earning prepared under other governance requirements.  If Western corporate 
governance requirements are universally applicable, including developing countries, then the 
Earnings 
Reliability 
Changes in 
Earnings  
Corporate 
Governance 
Wealth 
Movement in 
Economy 
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market response to earnings prepared under these governance requirements should be greater when 
other governance requirements used.   
GOVERNANCE 
A large segment of the corporate governance literature focuses on a direct relationship between 
corporate governance and corporate performance. Brown and Caylor (2001) demonstrate that 
corporate governance is strongly correlated with operating performance, valuation, and dividend 
payout for a large sample of US firms. Black et al. (2004) and Beiner et al. (2004) indicate that the 
direction of causality is likely to flow from corporate governance to performance rather than the 
other way round
1
. Numerous studies also find that individual attributes of good governance are 
associated with higher performance (Nguyen and Aman 2006; Brown and Ngo Higgins 2001; Xu 
and Wang 1999; Core et al. 1999; Diacon and O'Sullivan 1995; Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Mak 
and Li 2001; Dahya et al. 1998; Firth et al. 2006). 
There is an ongoing debate on whether the Western governance mechanisms are applicable to 
developing economies which might need different corporate governance systems (Perotti and Gelfer 
2001; Black 2001; Buck et al. 2000; Filatotchev et al. 1999; Dynkin and Ivanova 1998; Frydman et 
al. 1996; Puffer and McCarthy 2003; Buck 2003; Peng et al. 2003; Preobragenskaya and Mcgee ; 
Black et al. 2006; Judge et al. 2003). With the new and emerging market economies seeking to 
implement the “right” corporate governance, this debate has attracted serious attention from finance 
and legal scholars (John and Senbet 1998; Chen et al. 1999; Buck et al. 2000; Yoshikawa and Phan 
2003; Buck 2003; Suk-Yee Lee et al. 2005).  
Whether the Western governance findings related to developing economies requires further 
empirical research. This research seeks to add to this literature but restricts its focus to four key 
governance variables: 
 Shareholder Structure 
 Board Independence 
 Audit Quality 
 Accounting Standards 
No one study can cover all governance attributes however the four variables chosen in this study are 
the governance attributes that differ between the A and B share markets.  In addition, they are the 
variables that other studies have shown are significantly related to firm performance (Firth et al. 
                                                 
1
 There is a compelling argument for causality in the other direction. Poor performance by a firm may lead to 
changing their board structures and other governance variables (Dahya et al., 1998, Firth et al., 2006).   
1/30/2012 Faculty of Business 5 
2006; Chung et al. 2002; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2001; Zhou 2001; Benston 1982; Ding et al. 
2007; Chen et al. 1999; Gao and Tse 2004; Firth et al. 2007).  
SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE 
Since Berle and Means (1932), the relationship of ownership and control to firm performance is one 
of the most popular and enduring research topics in disciplines ranging from law and economics to 
management (LIU and WOO 2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 2007; Bratton 2001; La Porta et al. 
2000).  
Berle and Means (1932) addressed the problem of management responsibility stemming from the 
separation of ownership and control and implied that diffuse ownership adversely affects firm 
performance (Bratton 2001; Kapopoulos and Lazaretou 2007). From the recent development in the 
theory of firm’s ownership structure and its associated control mechanism, two dimensions have 
evolved: 
  the concentration of shareholdings/the degree of control, and  
  the identity or class of controlling shareholders.  
There is a large body of empirical literature focusing on the concentration of shareholdings 
dimension (Xu and Wang 1999; Brunello et al. 2003; Tian and Estrin 2005; Wang 2005; Goergen 
and Renneboog 2001; Bushman et al. 2004; Ding et al. 2007). This literature tests whether ‘owner 
controlled’ or ‘manager controlled’ companies performed better (Core and Larcker 2002; Zhou 
2001; Coles et al. 2001; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Hirschey 1999; Xu and Wang 1999; Craswell et 
al. 1997; Lichtenberg and Pushner 1994; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Boubakri et al. 2004; 
Yoshikawa and Phan 2003; Qiang 2003; Tian and Estrin 2005; Ho and Shun Wong 2001; Brown 
and Ngo Higgins 2001; Bauer et al. 2003; Lemmon and Lins 2001; Denis 2001; Walker 2006; 
Wang 2005; LIU and WOO 2001).  General speaking, dominant external shareholders would 
concern themselves only with the firm’s performance whereas internal shareholders may have other 
interests and objectives (Short 1994; LIU and WOO 2001; Nickell et al. 1997; McConnel and 
Servaes 1990; Morck et al. 1988). 
CHINESE SHAREHOLDER STRUCTURE 
The unique ownership structure of Chinese listed companies provides an excellent laboratory to test 
the impact of ownership by type of shareholder on firm performance.  Economists Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) generally view government ownership as being detrimental to corporate 
performance. Estrin and Perotin (1991) argue that firm’s performance can’t be maximised under the 
control of the government shareholder because the state has political as well as economic 
objectives. Megginson and Netter (2001) point out that State ownership is widely believed 
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inefficient, and privatization results in improved performance. Tian and Estrin (2005) examine the 
ownership structure of 826 Chinese listed companies and find that government shareholding is 
surprisingly large and its effect on corporate value is found to be negative.  
In line with the Western literature, the overall impact of state shareholding on corporate values in 
China is found to be negative. However, Qian (2003) suggest that in China government ownership 
can in fact be helpful, to company performance. The positive roles that the government shareholder 
can play come from preferential commercial treatment as well as governance advantages when state 
ownership is concentrated. Sun and Tong (2003) and Wang (2005) find that the relation between 
state ownership and operating performance is usually insignificant.  
The presence of foreign shareholders of B-shares provide an interesting study of the impact of 
shareholder structure on firm performance between A-shares firms and AB-shares firms in China.  
Combining the theory of inefficient government ownership with the Chinese institutional 
environment leads us to hypothesize that firms with a higher proportion of private shareholder, 
especially foreign shareholders will perform better than those that are heavily concentrated and 
dominated by the government shareholder.  
The arguments for ownership structure in the Chinese market are: 
 Government ownership may reduce firm performance due to the grabbing had of the 
government.   
 Government ownership is consistent among sample firms and should not have a comparative 
impact on firm performance 
 The existence of legal entities, while not being able to trade on markets, should lead to more 
improved firm performance particularly with respect to debt levels and debt governance 
 The addition of B class shares and its concomitant western governance standards, when 
combined with the above should lead to stronger governance overall. 
This leads to the first proposition as follows: 
Proposition One:  
Due to a higher proportion of private shareholder, especially foreign shareholders, AB- shares 
firms will perform better than A-shares firms that are heavily concentrated and dominated by the 
government shareholder. 
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THEORY OF BOARD INDEPENDENCE AND PERFORMANCE  
The first defensive line of shareholders against management’s opportunistic behavior is the board of 
directors (Weisbach 1993; Sundaramurthy et al. 1996; Watts and Zimmerman 1981; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990; Bhagat and Black 1999; Hossain et al. 2001). The board of directors carries out 
the monitoring function on behalf of shareholders.  It ensures that executive managers carry out 
their duties in a way that serves the best interests of shareholders.  Without the board, shareholders 
would find it difficult to exercise control due to wide dispersion of ownership of common stock 
(Fama and Jensen 1983; John and Senbet 1998).  
Much of the empirical research in corporate governance utilises data on formal board structures and 
independence to study the effectiveness of the board and its impact on firm performance (Tricker 
1994; Warther 1994; Hirshleifer and Thakor 1994; John and Senbet 1998).  These studies suggest 
that the effectiveness of the board is closely associated to the degree of board independence, and the 
board independence is highly related to its composition.  
The role of the board and its independence may be compromised in the Chinese market for A-
shares.  Most board members and managers of China’s listed firms have a status that corresponds to 
that of the civil servant. As ownership is heavily concentrated and dominated by the government, 
the board directors of China’s listed firms, particularly A-shares firms, may not be concerned about 
the interest and rights of individual shareholders.  
Highly independent boards impact on shareholders’ perception of earnings reliability and relevance. 
This is  because stronger board monitoring should enhance the information content of the financial 
reporting and should provide assurance to shareholders on the reliability of reported earnings 
(Anderson et al. 2003).
2 
 However, in the Chinese markets, the different status of Board Members, 
and their possibly compromised independence levels, may lead to a diminished impact of board 
independence and structure on firm performance.   
If firms with both A and B shares have corporate cultures and practices that are similar to western 
firms, then their board structure should reflect a higher level of board independence.  The greater 
independence of the boards of AB shares’ firms should result in shareholders’ perceiving earnings 
as being more reliable. This leads to the second proposition as follows: 
                                                 
2 Not many studies empirically examining the impact of board independence on shareholders’ perception of 
accounting earnings. Anderson et al., (2003) examine the impact and find that board independence is positively related 
to the information content of earnings. The results of Anderson et al. (2003) are limited by testing a single financial 
period and using a single proxy for unexpected earnings when testing the returns-earnings regression. 
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Proposition Two:  
The independence of boards of AB-shares’ firms produce more reliable earnings resulting in a 
significantly greater market reaction to earnings announcements relative to returns resulting 
from earnings announcements of A-shares firms.  
AUDIT QUALITY 
Auditors play a key role in terms of value relevance of accounting earnings as they provide 
investors with independent assurance that the firm's financial statements are fairly presented (Healy 
and Palepu 2001; Ball et al. 2000). Research shows that capital providers require firms to hire an 
independent auditor as a condition of financing, even when it is not required by regulation 
(Leftwich 1980). This implies that capital providers regard auditors as enhancing credibility (Klein 
2002; Abdel-khalik 2002; Wild 1994; DeFond et al. 2004; Siew Hong and Wong 1993).  
There is no empirical research that examines directly whether or not auditors significantly enhance 
the credibility of reported financial statements (Siew Hong 1992; Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
2001; Brown and Ngo Higgins 2001; Khurana and Raman 2006; Hutchinson and Gul 2004).   Healy 
and Palepu (2001) show the audit –related factors that affect credibility of financial statements 
include differences in audit standards, the legal framework governing the audit profession, 
enforcement of standards and rules, and differences in professional training requirements.  However 
research identifies auditor independence as the significant determinant of audit quality to financial 
statement credibility.  
A key element of audit quality is related auditor size and consequently suggests a positive 
association between audit quality and auditor size. Numerous studies in many countries have found 
that the largest audit firms with international reputations earn fee premiums due to their perceived 
higher quality (Niemi 2004). These fees reflect that high quality of audits impact on the reliability 
of the reports of company.   
Empirical research using Korean data, show there is no difference in audit fees between Big Six and 
non-Big Six, but Big Six auditors spend more time on their audits. The finding of Choi and Paek 
(2000) has implications for developing markets. While the quality difference between Big Six and 
other auditors is not recognised in fees, a large number of audit undertaken by the large firms many 
still provide the “net fee” difference suggested by DeAngelo (1981). The Chinese market reflects 
these characteristics. This suggests that Big Six auditors are not recognized as providing a higher 
quality service than non-Big auditors in at least one developing economy (Chung et al. 2002). 
(DeFond et al. 2004) find that the presence of foreign shareholders provides an incentive for the 
international joint venture partners to act independently in order to protect their reputation in 
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international capital markets and suggest that Big Four auditors have a market advantage over local 
Chinese auditors among the clientele that demand high-quality audits.  As the annual reports of AB-
shares are required to be audited by International CPAs, the market should perceive their earnings 
announcements to be more reliable. Furthermore, the greater Auditor independence of AB-shares’ 
firms should also result in shareholders’ perceiving earnings as being more reliable.  
If firms with both A and B shares have audit practices that are similar to western firms, then their 
financial statements should reflect a higher level of Auditor quality. This leads to the third 
proposition as follows:  
Proposition Three:  
B-shares’ financial statements audited by international CPAs have higher credibility and value-
relevance than does A-shares firms’ financial statements audited by Chinese CPAs.  
MARKET SEGMENTATION  
AB and A shares markets were rigidly segmented until February 2001. While domestic investors 
were allowed to invest in A-shares, foreign investors could invest only in B-shares. Domestic 
investors have been allowed to trade B-share using their foreign currency saving since 19 February 
2001. This was attributed to the poorly performing A-shares, illiquid B-shares’ markets and the 
government’s aiming to finance its social security fund gap. Furthermore, Qualified Foreign 
Institutional Investors (QFII) granted foreign institutions access to the domestic A share market on 
1 December 2002 (Qiang 2003; Ji 2005; Zhang and Wu).  
Despite these reforms, the question still remains, are the A-shares and B-shares markets no longer 
segmented after 2001? Because domestic investors have to use foreign currency to trade B shares, it 
may be argued that the Chinese stock markets are still partial segmented, particularly given China’s 
strict foreign currency control. This argument is consistent with the finding of Mei et al.(1999), as 
they indicate that the relaxation of restrictions on purchase of B-shares by domestic investors did 
not eliminate all premiums and they remained at a level around 80%.  
Chen et al.(2006) argue that a certain degree of segmentation still exists today and it is impossible 
for investors to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities. This is because China’s local currency, 
the Renminbi, is still not freely convertible - Chinese investors cannot purchase foreign currency in 
order to B-shares, and short selling is not allowed in either the A or B share markets.   
Given the restrictions on foreign currency purchases, the Chinese A-shares investor faces similar 
restrictions when considering arbitrage opportunities in the B-shares market and the B-shares 
market investor has similar characteristics to the investor on the foreign listing market.  Based on 
the limited literature on cross listing of firms (Chakravarty et al. 1998; Hooper and Heaney 2000; Ji 
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2005; Hietala 1989) and for markets where shares owned by foreign investors are trades separate 
from domestically-owned shares, we suggest that the segmented markets will effect market 
performance. Studies suggest that cross listing and or providing a segmented foreign market on a 
domestic board results in premiums over and above the domestically traded shares (Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1995); Bailey et al. (1999); Hietala (1989); Baily and Jagtiani (1994); Domowitz et 
al. (1997)) 
However, the Chinese market shows the opposite behaviour. The existing arguments and factors 
that explain the price premium in other markets cannot explain the opposite phenomenon in China.  
B-shares are known to trades at substantial discount to domestic A-shares. This anomaly has 
generated much interest among researchers (Suk-Yee Lee et al. 2005; Ji 2005; Guercio and 
Hawkins 1999; Bailey et al. 1997; Bailey 1994; Bass and Steidlmeier 1999; Guo et al. 2001).  
Qiang (2003), Bai et al.(2004) and Ji (2005) suggest that ineffective governance system has been 
believed as the root cause of the B-shares discounts. Their findings can be interpreted conversely 
that good corporate governance attracts a premium.  McKinsey’s findings on emerging markets 
show 80% of institutional investors and private equities are willing to pay a premium to well-
governed firms.  If this argument holds, then Chinese investors must view western governance 
standards as “poor” standards when compared to the Chinese standards.  
If the governance arguments hold, and the A-shares market views earnings announcements as more 
reliable than does the B-shares market, then the response to an earnings announcement will be 
greater in the A-shares market than in the B-shares market.  The above discussion regarding the 
segmenting of markets leads to the fourth proposition as follows:  
Proposition Four:  
(a) If Chinese stock markets are segmented, there is no difference in terms of reliability 
between an A-share company and an A-share of AB-shares company.   However B-share 
should have a lower response than A-share in an AB-shares company.  
Post 2001, the market segmentation should cease to exist.  
(b) If Chinese stock markets are not segmented, markets response to an A-share company’s 
announcement will be less than the response to an equivalent announcement of an A-share 
of AB-shares company. For a B-share announcement, there should be no difference in the 
response to the A-share and B-share of an AB shares company.  
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RESEARCH METHOD 
An event study methodology tests the four propositions developed from the literature using the 
abnormal returns (CAR- Cumulative Average Residuals) to measure the impact of governance on 
the performance of shares. Because there exists a class of traded shares with key Western 
governance standards (the companies with both A-shares and B-shares), their CAR can be 
compared with a matched portfolio of companies with Chinese governance standards (companies 
with A-shares only).  
Table 1 presents each proposition, a description of the experimental design, and the tests that 
support or reject the null hypotheses. The strength of the Chinese market as a site for testing the 
effects of governance comes with complications. These complications are: 
a. The apparent segmentation of the Chinese market prior to 2001 whereby Chinese local 
investors could not purchase B-shares. This research tests the aggregate period 1999 to 2003 
and two portions of 1999 to 2000, 2001 to 2003.  
b. The pricing anomaly identified by  Mei et al.(1999) whereby B-shares trade at a significant 
discount to A-shares. The sample period of Mei et al.(1999) was 1993-2001. Using an event 
study allows control for the factors.  
Proposition One to Three use Hypothesis One to test the market response to earnings for the period 
of 1999 to 2003. Because of possible segmentation issues, Hypothesis One is testing for the periods 
post and pre2001, and for the individual years. Hypothesis Two tests the relevance of international 
accounting standards. AB-shares companies produce two financial reports, one based on IAS and 
one based on Chinese GAPP.  
 Hypothesis Three and Four test the market segmentation theory.   
Table 1: Summary of the experimental designs of the propositions 
Proposition Description 
Experimental 
Design 
Hypothesis - Test of 
Significance 
One Due to a greater independence of the boards of AB-
shares’ firms, the earnings of AB shares should be more 
reliable. Therefore, the market reaction to earnings 
announcements by AB-shares firms will result in 
significantly greater positive returns relative to returns 
resulting from earnings announcements of A-shares firms.  
Event study of 
abnormal 
returns of A and 
AB. 
Hypothesis One- oH  
 
Two Due to a higher proportion of private shareholder, 
especially foreign shareholders, AB-shares firms will 
perform better than A-shares firms that are heavily 
concentrated and dominated by the government 
shareholder. 
Event study of 
abnormal 
returns of A and 
AB. 
 
 
Three B-shares’ financial statements audited by international 
CPAs have higher credibility and value-relevance than A-
shares firms’ financial statements audited by Chinese 
CPAs, because of this superior reliability.  
Event study of 
abnormal 
returns of A of 
AB  and A 
 
 
 
AAB ofA CAR CAR 
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Four(a) If Chinese stock markets are segmented prior to 2001, 
there is no difference in terms of reliability between an A-
share company and an A-share of AB-shares company.   
However B-share should have a greater response than A-
share in an AB-shares company, because of the superior 
reliability. 
Event study of 
abnormal 
returns of A of 
AB  and B of 
AB. 
Hypothesis Three- oH  
 
 
AB ofA  AB of  B CAR CAR 
 
Four(b) If Chinese stock markets are not segmented, markets 
response to an A-share company’s announcement will be 
less than the response to an equivalent announcement of 
an A-share of AB-shares company. For a B-share 
announcement, there should be no difference in the 
response to the A-share and B-share of an AB-shares 
company.  
Event study of 
abnormal 
returns of A, A 
of AB and B of 
AB. 
Hypothesis Four- oH  
 
 
SAMPLE AND DATA COLLECTION PROCEDURES 
The study covers the reporting period from 1
st
 of January 1999 to 31
st
 December 2003.  At the end 
of December 2003, number of listed companies in SHSE is 824 (770 A-shares, 54 B-shares, 
including 10 pure B-share companies) and in SZSE is 548 (491 A-shares, 57 B-shares, including 14 
pure B-share companies).  
MATCHING CRITERIA 
The sample covered companies from manufacturing, commercial, telecommunication, banking, 
transportation, public utilities, and other industrial sectors. The securities were selected from the 
population of all AB-share securities of SHSE and SZSE, for which daily return data were 
available. In addition two A-share securities were also selected. Thirteen firms issuing only B-
shares or with incomplete data were excluded. The two A-shares were selected to provide a control 
comparison between A and B shares.  The control sample was matched on Industry, Total assets, 
and Number of shares. While matching on the total shares is not a normal practice, we found it 
useful in limiting the potential heteroscedasticity problems in the data-analysis phase. Table 2 
reconciles the sample selection with the total AB-companies trading during the test period.  
TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF SELECTED SAMPLE FIRMS 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 TOTAL 
SHSE             
B-share of AB-shares 41 42 44 44 44   
   Less new listings past cut off 7 6 7 6 7   
B-share sample 34 36 37 38 37   
        
A-share of AB-shares (less new 
listings) 34 36 37 38 37 
  
       
A-share only 430 517 592 661 726   
  Less firms not in industry 269 356 379 407 474   
  Less firms with assets outside range 58 62 86 91 119   
  Less firms with shares outside range 35 27 53 87 59   
A-share paired sample 68 72 74 76 74   
Total  Sample 136 144 148 152 148   
   AB of B AB ofA  CARCAR  
1/30/2012 Faculty of Business 13 
SZSE             
B-share of AB-shares 41 44 44 43 43   
  Less new listings past cut off 7 10 7 6 5   
B-share sample 34 34 37 37 38   
       
A-share of AB-shares (less new 
listings) 34 34 37 37 38 
  
       
A-share only 411 457 456 452 450   
  Less firms not in industry 283 304 306 305 300   
  Less firms with assets outside range 36 48 42 43 42   
  Less firms with shares outside range 24 37 34 30 32   
A-share paired sample 68 68 74 74 76   
Total  Sample 136 136 148 148 152   
              
SHSE  & SZSE Total Sample 272 280 296 300 300 1448 
Daily stock price, volume data and market indices were provided by the two stock exchanges and 
reconciled with the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database
3
. 
Accounting, dates of announcements and other related company data were collected from the 
annual reports, the financial newspapers, the yearbooks of the two exchanges, and the CSMAR 
database.  
EVENT STUDY 
This application of the event study’s methodology is motivated by developments in both research 
and practice on the valuation effects of accounting information releases. Numerous studies find 
evidence of the informational content of earnings announcements among U.S markets and a number 
of non-U.S. markets (Cable and Holland 1999; Brown and Ngo Higgins 2001; Aktas et al. 2007; 
Ball et al. 2000; Corrado and Zivney 1992; Campbell and Wesley 1993; Ball and Brown 1968; Ball 
and Kothari 1991; Atiase and Bamber 1994; Klein 2002).  
In addition, an event study methodology helps control for some idiosyncratic aspects of the Chinese 
Markets.  Specifically, A-shares in an AB-share company trade at prices significantly higher than 
those of their B share counterpart (Chen et al. 2001; Li et al. 2006; Bass and Steidlmeier 1999).  
While in the pre-2001 market this may have been caused by a lack of liquidity in the B-share 
market, the abnormality still exists post 2001 when Chinese nationals with foreign currency could 
                                                 
3
 CSMAR database were jointly developed by the China Accounting and Finance Research Centre of Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University and the Shenzhen GTA Information Technology Co. Ltd.  
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purchase B-shares.  Arbitrage opportunities for Chinese traders should results in the difference 
being traded away.  Some research suggest that this anomaly is a function of political risk (Zhang 
and Zhao 2004; Hooper and Heaney 2000; Bass and Steidlmeier 1999; Chen et al. 2006). This 
explanation is less than satisfactory if one assumes that at a minimum, there is a weak-form-
efficient market.  Prior to 2001, foreign investors could have diversified away political risk.  Post 
2001 the same argument applies to foreign investors and Chinese domestic investors would 
perceive the political risks as the same between AB-shares in the same company. 
Another explanation is that the difference is the result of the undervaluing of the RMB exchange 
rate.  This proposition is yet to be fully tested.  As a result of the difference in the values between 
AB-shares, any test of the Ohlson (1995) or Easton and Harris (1991) that do not control for the 
“unknown” variable may mask the effect of corporate governance variables.  The event study 
enables one to identify the unique impact of an earnings announcement after controlling for the 
effect of other valuables.   
To test whether the Chinese markets react differently due to the the relaxation of restrictions on 
purchase of B-shares by domestic investors in 2001, the sample is divided into two testing period, 
pre 2001 and post2001.  
Further, to differentiate the markets’ reaction to different information, the sample for each sub-
period is classified into two groups based on the outcome of the event. An announcement belongs to 
Group I if the outcome of the event is ‘‘good news’’ (actual EPS exceeds last EPS). It belongs to 
Group II if the outcome of the event is ‘‘bad news’’ (actual EPS is equal to or less than last EPS) 
(Su 2003; Gao and Tse 2004). 
In theory, good news announcement or bad news announcement should be based on firm’s 
performance relative to the market’s expected performance. Traditionally analyst’s forecasts are the 
surrogate used for expected-market performance. However, earnings forecast reports were not 
available for the test period (Gao and Tse 2004; Su 2003; Eng and Mak 2003; Zhou 2001). For this 
research, the prior-quarter profit result was used as the surrogate fore market expectations. Where a 
firm outperformed its prior quarter earnings per share, it was classified as “good news”. An EPS is 
lower than prior quarter classified the firm as “bad news”.  
ABNORMAL RETURN 
Three different return-generating models (RGM), Market Model, Market-Adjusted Returns Model 
and Mean-Adjusted Returns Model were used to examine the abnormal stock returns (Brown and 
Ngo Higgins 2001). The earnings announcement day is selected as the predictable event day for 
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accessing the abnormal stock returns. If the market is efficient, stock prices should reflect all 
potential changes in the event outcomes (Su 2003).  
The event date is designated t = 0 as, the announcement date, the day of the annual earnings for a 
given security. For each security we use a maximum of 250 daily return observations for the period 
around its respective event, starting at day - 239 and ending at day + 10 relative to the event. The 
first 219 days in this period (- 239 through - 21) is designated the ‘estimation period’, and the 
following 31 days (- 20 through + 10) is designated the ‘event period’.  
In the event study literature, the null hypothesis to be tested is whether the mean abnormal return 
(the average residual, AR) at time t is equal to zero. The focus on the mean of the distribution of 
abnormal returns is to understand whether the event is, on average, associated with a change in 
security holder wealth (Ball et al. 2000; Ball and Kothari 1991; Brown and Ngo Higgins 2001).  
In this study, abnormal returns are tested for statistical significance using both parametric and non-
parametric tests. The performance of a portfolio method statistic, 1T , is compared with two 
alternative tests: Cross-sectional independence, 2T , and Corrado and Ziverny (1992) Sign test, 3T .  
For tests over the (- 20, + 10) interval, the test statistic is the ratio of the cumulative mean abnormal 
returns (CARs) to the estimated standard deviation, and is given where the terms in the denominator 
are from equation [3-6]. CARs method tests the null hypothesis that abnormal performance is equal 
to zero. The null hypothesis is rejected if the test statistic exceeds a critical value, typically 
corresponding to the 5% region (Fama et al. 1969; Brown and Ngo Higgins 2001).  
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics were generated for the samples used for each of the hypotheses to be tested. 
Stock price, PE ratio, earnings per share, total asset, total liabilities and number of share issued were 
collected and analysed.  
B-share prices increased significantly in both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets in 2000. This 
phenomenon could be the expectation of the relaxation of restrictions on purchase of B shares by 
domestic investors effective from February 2001. However the regulation changed in 2001 did not 
eliminate the A-shares price premiums. But it reduced from a level around 80% to 50% in both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets.  A-shares price premiums have remained at a level around 50% 
for both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. This finding is consistent with the finding of Mei et 
al.(1999). The implication of this finding suggests that the Chinese markets may have remained 
segmented after the regulation change in 2001. 
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Table 3: Sample Descriptive Statistics 1999-2003 
Period: 1999-2003
Type of Shares
Shanghai A P PE EPS TA TL No. of Share
Mean     12.07     104.52 0.17      2,034,480        958,454          395,607 
Standard Deviation       4.79     105.07 0.23      3,582,286     2,821,903          549,713 
Minimum       3.38         7.72 -1.00         325,156          65,294            87,207 
Maximum     32.17     552.56 0.72    31,699,991   25,217,413       4,866,950 
N=364
Shanghai A of AB P PE EPS TA TL No. of Share
Mean     12.51     256.87 0.05      3,277,962     1,896,855          540,995 
Standard Deviation       3.11     284.39 0.23      3,053,843     2,490,596          332,888 
Minimum       5.43 -31.25 -0.65         421,739        166,817          115,133 
Maximum     20.37  1,270.40 0.50    16,965,638   14,958,381       1,867,684 
N=182
Shanghai B of AB P PE EPS TA TL No. of Share
Mean       5.44       93.44 0.05      3,277,962     1,896,855          540,995 
Standard Deviation       1.48       93.99 0.23      3,053,843     2,490,596          332,888 
Minimum       3.16 -20.46 -0.65         421,739        166,817          115,133 
Maximum       9.95     290.87 0.50    16,965,638   14,958,381       1,867,684 
N=70
Shenzhen A P PE EPS TA TL No. of Share
Mean     10.48       66.01 0.13      1,907,762        763,463          418,329 
Standard Deviation       3.83     111.82 0.26      1,391,648        718,467          295,120 
Minimum       5.05 -648.00 -0.74         168,912          67,430            90,486 
Maximum     20.47     392.26 0.74      6,732,571     4,459,011       1,627,500 
N=360
Shenzhen A of AB P PE EPS TA TL No. of Share
Mean     11.64     135.84 0.14      3,259,009     1,794,842          531,621 
Standard Deviation       3.42     190.33 0.40      2,873,385     1,705,528          412,447 
Minimum       6.22 -40.43 -1.09         250,026          85,950          163,416 
Maximum     23.12     833.20 1.18    11,250,712     5,540,270       2,368,264 
N=180
Shenzhen B of AB P PE EPS TA TL No. of Share
Mean       5.64       60.29 0.14      3,259,009     1,794,842          531,621 
Standard Deviation       2.18       75.10 0.40      2,873,385     1,705,528          412,447 
Minimum       2.00 -12.89 -1.09         250,026          85,950          163,416 
Maximum     13.13     360.43 1.18    11,250,712     5,540,270       2,368,264 
N=180
Notes:
TL: Total Liabilities (RMB 000) at the end of financial year
No. of Share: No. of Shares (000) issued at the end of financial year
EPS: Earnings per share (RMB)  at the end of financial year
TA: Total Assets (RBM 000) at the end of financial year
P: Stock price ( RMB) at the announcement date
 
A of AB shares also have a higher PE ratio than A-shares in both Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
markets. For example, the PE ratio is an average of 165% greater in Shanghai and 97% greater in 
Shenzhen for the testing period from 1999 to 2003. This finding implies that Chinese listed 
companies based on Western governance perform better than Chinese listed companies based on 
Chinese governance. Furthermore, the expectation of the removal of the B-share trading restriction 
caused PE ratio to be boosted in both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets in 2000. However, PE ratio 
of the A of AB-shares remains greater than PE ratio of the B of AB-shares. This also suggests that 
the Chinese markets are still segmented after the B-share trading restriction lifted in 2001.  The 
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descriptive statistics for the test period was presented in Table 3 for the total period only for both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets.  
Hypothesis One 
Hypothesis One tests for the impact of governance structure, board independence, share ownership, 
and audit quality for the periods of 1999-2000 and 2001-2003. It examines whether these structural 
factors have the same effect pre and post 2001.  Tests were conducted using all three models. In 
general, the results for the Market model and the Market Adjusted Returns model are consistent. 
The Mean model is inconsistent with the other models when testing the effects of bad news.  
The test of the hypothesis proceeds in two stages. First we determine whether the cumulative 
residuals (CRs) for the good news and bad news samples are significantly different from zero.  Each 
sample contains a sub-sample of A-share and A of AB-share companies matched on the criteria 
specified earlier. In stage One, we test if the CRs for each sub-sample are significantly different 
from zero. Second we determine of the CRs are different between the sub-samples of matched pairs.  
For stage One, the CRs for each sub-sample are tested to examine whether they are significantly 
different from zero. Table 4, Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 present test statistic computed based on 
Market model, Mean model and Market Adjusted Returns model for the pre 2001 period. The 
results for the Shanghai market are shown in Table 4 and Table 6. Table 4 presents the result of 
good news announcements and Table 6 presents the results of bad news announcements. Table 5 
and Table 7 show the corresponding results for the good news and bad news announcements for the 
Shenzhen market.  From the results
4
 of Table 4 and Table 5, the CRs of good news announcements 
are all significantly different from zero for the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. 
Table 4: Shanghai Good News Earnings Response - CR T-Statistic 1999-2000  
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 3.12* 22.53* 3.11* 
Mean Model CAR T1 1.70* 10.62* 7.86* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 6.38* 25.08* 10.30* 
 N: 43 43 109 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
 
                                                 
4
 The results of T1 (the standard portfolio method) are consistent with the results of T2 (the cross-sectional) and T3 (the 
Carrando and Zivney sign test). Detailed calculations are presented in Appendix 5 to Appendix 26.   
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Table 5: Shenzhen Good News Earnings Response - CR T-Statistic 1999-2000 
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 6.24* 20.93* 3.31* 
Mean Model CAR T1 5.35* 11.71* 5.77* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 8.40* 20.83* 8.08* 
 N: 54 54 108 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
From the results of Table 6 and Table 7, it can be seen that the CRs of bad news announcements are 
almost significantly different from zero for the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets.  
Table 6: Shanghai Bad News Earnings Response - CR T-Statistic 1999-2000  
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 8.81* 12.32* -5.17* 
Mean Model CAR T1 1.93* 0.83 -3.40* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 11.12* 12.60* -5.15* 
 N: 27 27 31 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
 
Table 7: Shenzhen bad News Earnings Response - CR T-Statistic 1999-2000 
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 -1.04 3.76* 11.91* 
Mean Model CAR T1 -3.49* -3.34* 7.27* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 -0.12 3.29* 8.67* 
 N: 14 14 28 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
A better understanding of the statistical result s for the period 1999 to 2000 can be seen from the 
graphs of the CRs.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 show event- period graphs of the CRs for “Good News” 
announcements for Shanghai and Shenzhen respectively. It can be seen clearly that the residuals of 
A of AB-shares is greater than A-shares’ for the Shenzhen market only.  
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Figure 2: Shanghai Good News Earnings Responses 1999-2000 
 
Figure 3: Shenzhen Good News Earnings Responses 1999-2000 
 
For stage Two, we determine if the CRs are different between the sub-samples of matched pairs. 
The results are shown in Table 8 and Table 9. Table 8 shows that the mean of A of AB-share CARs 
is slightly greater than A-shares but it is not significant (p = 0.05). The results do not support H1A1 
therefor it should be rejected.  
Table 8: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shanghai Good News CR 1999-2000 (A of AB : A) - t-Test: 
Paired Two Sample for Means 
  A of AB A 
Mean 0.012121 0.00997176 
Variance 0.006884 0.00460199 
Observations 43 43 
Pearson Correlation 0.081245  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 42  
t Stat 0.137089  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.445808  
t Critical one-tail 1.681952  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.891615  
t Critical two-tail 2.018082  
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Table 9: Matched Pairs t-Test - Shenzhen Good News Announcements CR 1999-2000 (A 
of AB : A) -t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
  A of AB A 
Mean 0.01797723 -0.01967278 
Variance 0.015062829 0.006741109 
Observations 54 54 
Pearson Correlation 0.177210759  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 53  
t Stat 2.048983351  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.022714425  
t Critical one-tail 1.674116237  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.045428849  
t Critical two-tail 2.005745949  
From the results of Table 9, it can be seen that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is greater than A-
shares’ and t-statistic is 2.04, which is significant at P=0.02. The results support that the earnings 
response of the A of AB-shares is greater than A-shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore 
H1B1 should not be rejected. In terms of “Bad News” announcements, the statistical results for the 
period 1999 to 2000 can be seen from the graphs of the CRs 
For the results of matched pairs, they are shown in Table 10 and Table 11. Table 10 shows that the 
mean of A of AB-share CARs is greater than A-shares’ and t-statistic is 2.73, which is significant at 
P of 0.005. The results support that the earnings response of the A of AB-shares for the “Bad News” 
announcements is greater than A-shares’ for the Shanghai market and therefore H1C0 should be 
rejected.  
Table 10: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shanghai Bad News Announcements CRs 1999-2000 (A of 
AB : to A) - t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  A of AB A 
Mean 0.043913 -0.02326502 
Variance 0.009348 0.008401725 
Observations 27 27 
Pearson Correlation 0.079184  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 26  
t Stat 2.730286  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.005604  
t Critical one-tail 1.705618  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.011207  
t Critical two-tail 2.055529   
From the results of Table 11, it can be seen that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is less than A-
shares’ and t-statistic is -1.29, which is not significant at 0.05 level of significance. The results do 
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not support that the earnings response of the A of AB-shares for the “Bad News” announcements is 
greater than A-shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore H1D1 should be rejected.  
Table 11: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shenzhen Bad News 
Announcements 1999-2000 CR (A of AB : to A) - t-Test: Paired Two 
Sample for Means 
 A of AB A 
Mean -0.0029668 0.0541040 
Variance 0.0201496 0.0161284 
Observations 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0.254226675  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 13  
t Stat 
-
1.296871702  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.108610755  
t Critical one-tail 1.770933383  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.21722151  
t Critical two-tail 2.160368652   
For pre 2001, mixed results were found for the test of Hypothesis One (a) when controlling for good 
news and bad news and for the market in which the shares are traded.  For the Shanghai Market, 
there is no significant difference between the CARs of the A of AB shares compared with those of 
the A shares while there is a significant difference for the “bad news” portfolio.  Conversely, the 
Shenzhen market shows a significant differences between the CARs of the A of AB shares 
compared with those of the A shares for “good news” announcements but no significant difference 
for “bad news” announcements. The results of Hypotheses One (a) for the pre 2001 period are 
inconclusive. 
Table12: Shanghai Good News Earnings Response - CR T-Statistic 2001-2003  
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 -4.92* -7.36* -3.83* 
Mean Model CAR T1 0.52 -6.16* 14.71* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 -4.98* -6.92* -3.35* 
 N: 69 69 169 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
Table13: Shenzhen Good News Earnings Response - CR T-Statistic 2001-2003 
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 -2.84* -2.98* 0.04 
Mean Model CAR T1 -3.15* -3.28* 3.93* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 -2.77* -1.18 3.04* 
 N: 77 77 148 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
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Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
For the results of the post 2001 period, Table 12, Table 13, Table 14 and Table 15 present test 
statistic computed based on Market model, Mean model and Market Adjusted Returns model for the 
pre 2001 period. The results for the Shanghai market are shown in Table 12 and Table14. Table 12 
presents the result of good news announcements and Table 14 presents the results of bad news 
announcements. Table 13 and Table 15 show the corresponding results for the good news and bad 
news announcements for the Shenzhen market. From the results of Table 12 and Table 13, it can be 
seen that the CRs of good news announcements are almost significantly different from zero for the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. 
From the results of Table 14 and Table 15, it can be seen that the CRs of bad news announcements 
are significantly different from zero for the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets.  
Table 14: Shanghai Bad News Earnings Response - CRs T-Statistic 2001-2003 
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 -15.75* -19.92* -2.68* 
Mean Model CAR T1 -12.59* -18.78* -1.07 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 -11.91* -16.65* -5.48* 
 N: 43 43 55 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
 
Table15: Shenzhen bad News Earnings Response - CRs T-Statistic 2001-2003 
Model Class of Shares A of AB B of AB A  
 T-Statistic    
Market Model CAR T1 -9.87* -12.22* -6.17* 
Mean Model CAR T1 -11.14* -14.55* -6.08* 
Market Adjusted Returns CAR T1 -15.28* -15.72* -12.51* 
 N: 35 35 76 
* = Significant at P = 5%     
Interval :CAR -10, +10     
Rejection region at 5%     
T1: the standard portfolio method t-statistic        
For the results of matched pairs, they are shown in Table 15 and Table 16. Table 17 shows that the 
mean of A of AB-share CARs is less than A-shares’ and t-statistic is -0.86, which is not significant 
at 0.05 level of significance. The results do not support that the earnings response of the A of AB-
shares for the “Good News” announcements is greater than A-shares’ for the Shanghai market and 
therefore H1E1 should be rejected.  
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Table 15: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shanghai Good News Announcements CRs 
2001-2003 (A of AB : to A) - t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 A of AB A 
Mean -0.01041 0.00587451 
Variance 0.005863 0.01843586 
Observations 69 69 
Pearson Correlation 0.005085  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 68  
t Stat -0.86979  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.193737  
t Critical one-tail 1.667572  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.387475  
t Critical two-tail 1.995469   
From the results of Table 15, it can be seen that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is less than A-
shares’ and t-statistic is -1.02, which is not significant at 0.05 level of significance. The results do 
not support that the earnings response of the A of AB-shares for the “Good News” announcements 
is greater than A-shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore H1F1 should be rejected.  
Table 16: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shenzhen Good News Announcements CRs 
2001-2003 (A of AB : A) t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
 A of AB A 
Mean -0.005325 0.005250783 
Variance 0.006032 0.012623896 
Observations 77 77 
Pearson Correlation 0.268608  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 76  
t Stat -0.785195  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.21739  
t Critical one-tail 1.665151  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.43478  
t Critical two-tail 1.991673   
In terms of “Bad News” announcements, the statistical results for the period 2001 to 2003 can be 
seen from the graphs of the CRs.   
For the results of matched pairs, they are shown in Table 16 and Table 17. From the results of Table 
16, it can be seen that there is a significant difference between the means, P=0.008. However, the 
mean of A of AB-share CARs is less than A-shares’. The results do not support that the earnings 
response of the A of AB-shares for the “Bad News” announcements is greater than A-shares’ for the 
Shanghai market and therefore H1G1 should be rejected.  
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Table 16: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shanghai Bad News Announcements CRs 2001-2003 (A 
of AB : to A) t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  A of AB A 
Mean -0.04971 -0.00847575 
Variance 0.009763 0.006286473 
Observations 43 43 
Pearson Correlation 0.27497  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 42  
t Stat -2.49545  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.008297  
t Critical one-tail 1.681952  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.016594  
t Critical two-tail 2.018082   
Table 17 indicates that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is less than A-shares’ and t-statistic is -
0.98, which is not significant at 0.05 level of significance. The results do not support that the 
earnings response of the A of AB-shares for the “Bad News” announcements is greater than A-
shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore H1H1 should be rejected. 
Table 17: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shenzhen Bad News Announcements CRs 2001-2003 (A 
of AB : to A) t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  A of AB A 
Mean -0.028076 -0.00274799 
Variance 0.012165 0.008408843 
Observations 35 35 
Pearson Correlation -0.134126  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 34  
t Stat -0.981936  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.166534  
t Critical one-tail 1.690924  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.333067  
t Critical two-tail 2.032244   
For the post 2001 period, the CARs for the A of AB shares are not significantly greater than those 
of the A-shares for Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. The effect of these structural factors for the pre 
2001 period is greater than the effect for the post 2001. However, these effects are not significant. 
The results of Hypotheses One (b) do not support that a better governance structure of A of AB 
shares will result in significantly greater abnormal returns.  
TEST RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS TWO 
The earnings of the B-shares based on IAS, in contrast to Chinese GAAP, are more value-relevant 
due to increased information disclosures. Hypothesis Two tests the relevance of international 
accounting standards. It examines whether investors react differently to earning announcements 
based on IAS and earnings announcements based on Chinese GAAP for the period of 2001-2003.  
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The basis of this test rests with the nature of the disclosures. Financial statements are presented in a 
fashion similar to that of dual companies accounts prepared under international accounting 
standards are reconciled to the results using Chinese accounting standards. When the announcement 
of an AB-shares company occurs, the newspapers carry the Chinese profit number. If the A and B 
of the AB-shares operate in a segmented market, we would expect significant differences in the 
CARs.  
As shown in the descriptive statistics, B-shares’ experienced a significant growth in share price for 
the pre 2001 period. This phenomenon could be the expectation of the relaxation of restrictions on 
purchase of B-shares in 2001. B-shares’ significant growth for the pre 2001 period may provide an 
invalid testing result. Therefore, the test period of Hypothesis Two is the post 2001.  
The results of the stage One for the post 2001 period are also presented in Table 5-14, Table 5-15, 
Table 5-16 and Table 5-17. From the results of these tables, it can be seen that the CRs of good 
news and bad news announcements are significantly different from zero for the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen markets. 
The results of matched pairs for Hypothesis Two are shown in Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 and 
Table 21. The results for the Shanghai market are shown in Table 18 and Table 20. Table 18 
presents the result of good news announcements and Table 20 presents the results of bad news 
announcements. Table 19 and Table 21 show the corresponding results for the good news and bad 
news announcements for the Shenzhen market.  
From the results of Table 18, it can be seen that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is slightly greater 
than B of AB-shares’ and t-statistic is 0.85, which is not significant at 0.05 level of significance. 
The results do not support that the earnings response of the B of AB-shares for the “Good News” 
announcements is greater than A of AB-shares’ for the Shanghai market and therefore H2A1 should 
be rejected.  
Table 18: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shanghai Good News Announcements 
CRs 2001-2003 (A of AB : B of AB) t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means  
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean -0.01041 -0.02036 
Variance 0.005863 0.005373 
Observations 69 69 
Pearson Correlation 0.177282  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 68  
t Stat 0.859538  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.196532  
t Critical one-tail 1.667572  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.393064  
t Critical two-tail 1.995469  
1/30/2012 Faculty of Business 26 
From the results of Table 19, it can be seen that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is greater than B 
of AB-shares’ and t-statistic is 0.27, which is not significant at 0.05 level of significance. The 
results do not support that the earnings response of the B of AB-shares for the “Good News” 
announcements is greater than A of AB-shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore H2B1 should 
be rejected.  
TABLE 19: MATCHED PAIRS T-TEST FOR SHENZHEN GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS CRS 2001-
2003 (A OF AB : B OF AB) T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean -0.005325 -0.007812 
Variance 0.006032 0.007966 
Observations 77 77 
Pearson Correlation 0.570104  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 76  
t Stat 0.279601  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.390272  
t Critical one-tail 1.665151  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.780543  
t Critical two-tail 1.991673  
Table 20 shows that there is a significant difference between the means, P=0.007 at the 0.05 level of 
significance. However, the mean of B of AB-share CARs is less than A of AB-shares’. The results 
do not support H2C1 which should be rejected.  
Table 20: Matched Pairs t-Test For Shanghai Bad News Announcements CRs 2001-2003 (A of 
AB : to B of AB) - t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean -0.04971 -0.07324 
Variance 0.009763 0.006173 
Observations 43 43 
Pearson Correlation 0.328695  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 42  
t Stat 1.482536  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.072831  
t Critical one-tail 1.681952  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.145663  
t Critical two-tail 2.018082  
Table 21 shows that the mean of A of AB-share CARs is greater than B of AB-shares’ and t-statistic 
of 2.22 is significant at P of 0.016. The results do not support H2D1 which should be rejected.  
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TABLE 21: MATCHED PAIRS T-TEST FOR SHENZHEN BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS CRS 2001-
2003 (A OF AB : B OF AB) - T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean -0.028076 -0.056928 
Variance 0.012165 0.008856 
Observations 35 35 
Pearson Correlation 0.729561  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 34  
t Stat 2.226739  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.016347  
t Critical one-tail 1.690924  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.032694  
t Critical two-tail 2.032244  
The results of the post 2001 period suggest that the effect of international accounting standards is 
not significant. The results do not support that the earnings of the B-shares based on IAS, in 
contrast to Chinese GAAP, are more value-relevant due to increased information disclosures.  
TEST RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS THREE 
In the segmented market up to 2001, the earnings responses of the B-share of an AB-Share 
company should be greater than the A-Share of an AB-Share company in the Chinese markets.  
Hypothesis Three tests whether the Chinese stock markets are segmented for the pre 2001.  
Table 22 shows that the mean of B of AB-share CARs is greater than A of AB-shares’ and t-statistic 
is -4.5, which is significant at 0.01 level of significance. The results support that the earnings 
response of the B of AB-shares for “Good News” announcements is greater than A of AB-shares’ 
for the Shanghai market and therefore H3A0 should be rejected.  
TABLE 22: MATCHED PAIRS T-TEST FOR SHANGHAI GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS CRS 1999-
2000 (A OF AB : TO B OF AB) - T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean 0.012121 0.152787 
Variance 0.006884 0.037521 
Observations 43 43 
Pearson Correlation 0.088384  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 42  
t Stat -4.52444  
P(T<=t) one-tail 2.45E-05  
t Critical one-tail 1.681952  
P(T<=t) two-tail 4.91E-05  
t Critical two-tail 2.018082  
Table 23 shows that the mean of B of AB-share CARs is greater than A of AB-shares. The result is 
significant at p of 0.001. The results support that the earnings response of the B of AB-shares is 
greater than A of AB-shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore H3B0 should be rejected.  
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TABLE 23: MATCHED PAIRS T-TEST FOR SHENZHEN GOOD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS CRS 1999-
2000 (A OF AB : TO B OF AB) - T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean 0.017977 0.136059 
Variance 0.015063 0.078155 
Observations 54 54 
Pearson Correlation 0.319447  
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0  
df 53  
t Stat -3.24969  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001005  
t Critical one-tail 1.674116  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002009  
t Critical two-tail 2.005746  
Table 24 shows that the mean of B of AB-share CARs is greater than A of AB-shares’ and t-statistic 
is -2.05, which is significant at P of 0.02. The results support that the earnings response of the B of 
AB-shares for “Bad News” announcements is greater than A of AB-shares’ for the Shanghai market 
and therefore H3C0 should be rejected.  
TABLE 24: MATCHED PAIRS T-TEST FOR SHANGHAI BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS CRS 1999-
2000 (A OF AB : TO B OF AB) - T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean 0.043913 0.123235 
Variance 0.009348 0.032743 
Observations 27 27 
Pearson Correlation 0.054676  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 26  
t Stat -2.05628  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.024961  
t Critical one-tail 1.705618  
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.049922  
t Critical two-tail 2.055529  
Table 25 shows that the mean of B of AB-share is greater than A of AB-shares’ which is not 
significant at 0.05 level (p =0 .17). The results support that the earnings response of the B of AB-
shares is greater than A of AB-shares’ for the Shenzhen market and therefore H3D1 is rejected.  
TABLE 25: MATCHED PAIRS T-TEST FOR SHENZHEN BAD NEWS ANNOUNCEMENTS CRS 1999-
2000 (A OF AB : TO B OF AB) - T-TEST: PAIRED TWO SAMPLE FOR MEANS 
  A of AB B of AB 
Mean -0.00297 0.043509 
Variance 0.02015 0.037884 
Observations 14 14 
Pearson Correlation 0.452308  
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0  
df 13  
t Stat -0.95667  
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.178093  
t Critical one-tail 1.770933  
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P(T<=t) two-tail 0.356185  
t Critical two-tail 2.160369  
The results of the pre 2001 clearly indicate that the earnings response of the B of AB-shares is 
greater than A of AB-shares’ for the both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets, and suggest that the 
Chinese stock markets were segmented for the pre 2001.  
TEST RESULTS FOR HYPOTHESIS FOUR 
Hypothesis Four tests whether market segmentation will not exist for the post 2001 by examines 
that the earnings response for the B of AB-shares will be the same as the A of AB-shares as both 
have the same quality of governance. 
The results of the stage One for the post 2001 show that CRs of good news and bad news 
announcements are significantly different from zero for the Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. The 
results of the stage One for the post 2001 are presented in Table 5-14, Table 5-15, Table 5-16 and 
Table 5-17 in Section 5.3.2. 
The results of matched pairs for Hypothesis Four are also shown in Table 18, Table 19, Table 20 
and Table 21. The results of these tables show that the earnings responses of the A of AB-shares 
and the B of AB-shares are not the same for both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. The results do 
not support that that the earnings response for the B of AB-shares will be the same as the A of AB-
shares as both have the same quality of governance. Therefore, H4A1, H4B1, H4C1 and H4D1 should 
be all rejected. These results suggest that the Chinese stock markets remained segmented after the 
relaxation of restrictions on purchase of B-shares by domestic investors in 2001.  
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As stated in Section 5-1, the findings of the descriptive statistics are summarised as follows. 
(a) The descriptive statistics presented in this chapter show the relaxation of B-share trading 
restriction did not eliminate the A-shares price premiums, but it reduced from a level 
around 80% to 50% in both Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. This finding is consistent with 
the finding of Mei et al.(1999). The implication of this finding suggests that the Chinese 
markets remain segmented after the regulation change in 2001. This finding is also 
consistent with the results of Hypotheses Four stated in Section 5.3.5.  
(b) The impact of relaxation of B-share trading restriction in 2001 was significant in both 
Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. B-shares’ stock price and PE ratio were boosted in 2000. 
For example, Shanghai B of AB sample mean stock price increased by 290% , Shenzhen B 
of AB sample mean stock price increased by 78%, Shanghai A of AB sample mean share 
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price increased by 19% and Shenzhen A of AB sample mean share price increased by 10% 
in 2000.  
(c) Mixed results were found for the test of Hypothesis One(a) when controlling for good news 
and bad news and for the market in which the shares are traded.  For the Shanghai Market, 
there is no significant difference between the CARs of the A of AB shares compared with 
those of the A shares while there is a significant difference for the “bad news” portfolio.  
Conversely, the Shenzhen marker shows a significant differences between the CARs of the 
A of AB shares compared with those of the A shares for “good news” announcements but 
no significant difference for “bad news” announcements. The results of Hypotheses One(a) 
suggest pre 2001 period are inconclusive. 
(d) For the post 2001 period, the CARs for the A of AB shares are not significantly greater than 
those of the A shares for Shanghai and Shenzhen markets. The effect of these structural 
factors for the pre 2001 period is greater than the effect for the post 2001. However, these 
effects are not significant. The findings do not support that a better governance structure of 
A of AB shares will result in significantly greater abnormal returns.  
(e) The results of Hypothesis Two indicate that the effect of international accounting standards 
is not significant for the post 2001. The results do not support that the earnings of the B-
shares based on IAS, in contrast to Chinese GAAP, are more value-relevant due to 
increased information disclosures.  
(f) The findings of Hypothesis Three and Four indicate that the Chinese stock markets were 
segmented before the relaxation of restrictions on purchase of B-shares by domestic 
investors in 2001 and they remained segmented after the regulation change in 2001.   
The results show that the impact of governance structure, board independence, share ownership, and 
audit quality are not significant for both the pre 2001 period and the post 2001 period. The effect of 
these structural factors for the pre 2001 period is greater than the effect for the post 2001. However, 
these effects are not significant. The findings do not support that a better governance structure of A 
of AB shares will result in greater returns.  
The effect of international accounting standards is not significant for the post 2001. The results do 
not support that the earnings of the B-shares based on IAS, in contrast to Chinese GAAP, are more 
value-relevant due to increased information disclosures.  
Our results also show that the market segmentation in the Chinese stock markets that existed pre 
2001 still persists for the post 2001.  
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The overall conclusion is that the use of international governance standards makes no significant 
difference to the market’s reaction to accounting information. Contrary to expectation, there is no 
statistical support for the superior reliability of earnings information provided using International 
Accounting Standards.  One explanation for the results is that the security provided by the 
government’s involvement in the control of management. This situation may be equally effective in 
mitigating the agency costs normally accepted as existing in the manager / shareholder relationship.  
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